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As is the case of any economic activity, cultural factors are tightly linked to cybercrimes, 
cyberattacks and cybersecurity. Just like any other activities, some forms of cybercrime may be 
more acceptable in some cultures than in others. For some categories of cyberoffenses, cultural 
factors appear to play more important roles than other environmental factors. For instance, 
cybercrimes are more justifiable in some cultures. Quoting a Russian hacker-turned-teacher, 
Blau (2004) describes how he and his friends hacked programs and distributed them for free 
during their childhood: “It was like our donation to society, it was a form of honor; [we were] 
like Robin Hood bringing programs to people.” Likewise, it is argued that culture and ethical 
attitudes may be a more crucial factor in driving software piracy as well as a number of other 
cybercrimes than the levels of economic development (Donaldson, 1996; Kshetri, 2009b, 2013a, 
b, c, d; Kwong et al., 2003). 
 






As is the case of any economic activity, cultural factors are tightly linked to cybercrimes, cyber-
attacks and cybersecurity. Just like any other activities, some forms of cybercrime may be more 
acceptable in some cultures than in others. For some categories of cyberoffenses, cultural factors 
appear to play more important roles than other environmental factors. For instance, cybercrimes 
are more justifiable in some cultures. Quoting a Russian hacker-turned-teacher, Blau (2004) 
describes how he and his friends hacked programs and distributed them for free during their 
childhood: “It was like our donation to society, it was a form of honor; [we were] like Robin 
Hood bringing programs to people.” Likewise, it is argued that culture and ethical attitudes may 
be a more crucial factor in driving software piracy as well as a number of other cybercrimes than 
the levels of economic development (Donaldson, 1996; Kshetri, 2009b, 2013a, b, c, d; Kwong et 
al., 2003). 
 
Theoretical, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that cultural factors exert a strong 
influence on the nature and patterns of cybercrime and cybersecurity. At the most basic level, 
cultural factors influence how issues around a crime (e.g., cybercrime) are constructed and how a 
cybercrime is defined (Brownstein, 2000). Unsurprisingly, the definition of cybercrime varies 
dramatically across cultures. Hamadoun Touré, secretary-general of the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) noted: “Pornography in one country is a crime; in another it’s 
freedom of behavior” (Meyer, 2010). As such, cybercrimes and cyberoffenses have varying 
degrees of social and cultural acceptability across the world. They range from passive acceptance 
to outright celebration of “patriotic” hacker-heroes (Kshetri 2013d; Fowler, 2013). Indeed, 
important cross-cultural variation exists regarding what behavior is considered to be acceptable 
or unacceptable. 
 
The orientation of a culture towards a cybercrime activity may differ depending on who the 
cybercriminals, victims and potential beneficiaries are. In the above example, distributing 
software stolen from a foreign company’s website in a society may be received favorably 
because individuals in the society benefit from such activities. No less important in this example 
is who the victim is. The society may view a cybercrime differently when the victim is a foreign 
company rather than a domestic company. The idea of cultural Others may help us understand 
this phenomenon better. Jandt and Tanno (2001, p. 122) note: “In contemporary times as in 
colonial times, cultural Others have not been defined according to who they are but rather who 
they are not.” In the same vein, Hoare (1991) argues that “all humans may possess the seeds of 
pseudo-speciation, of prejudice against dissimilar groups and values” (p. 52). 
 
Due primarily to the newness of cybercrime, there has been surprisingly little theoretical and 
empirical work on the effects of cultural factors on cybercrime and cybersecurity. In general 
cyberspace the issue is underexplored in cross-cultural management (CCM). In an attempt to 
contribute to filling this void, in this chapter we seek to provide a better understanding of the link 
between cultural factors and cybercrime/cybersecurity and shed light on implications for CCM. 
In this chapter we try to achieve three objectives: (1) to explain how different aspects of culture 
are linked with definition and conceptualization of cybercrime, propensity to commit 
cybercrimes and types of cybercrimes likely to be committed; (2) to examine some elements of 
culture that are linked with cybersecurity; and (3) to illustrate how cyberattacks are more 
justifiable and acceptable from the perpetrator’s point of view when the victims are cultural 
Others. 
 
A cybercrime is defined as a criminal activity in which computers or computer networks are the 
principal means of committing an offense or violating laws, rules or regulations (Kshetri, 2009a). 
We follow the ITU’s definition of cybersecurity: 
 
Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and 
user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, 
personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the 
totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity 
strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the 
organization and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. 
(ITU, U.D.) 
 
Following Jandt and Tanno (2001), we use the term cultural Others to refer to “groups of people 
perceived to be outside defined boundaries, at the margins of acceptance” (p. 119). 
 
Cultural factors affecting cybercrime 
 
Prior literature has provided some indications on the link of culture with cybercrimes and cyber-
security (Kshetri, 2005, 2006, 2009a; 2010a, b, c, d; 2013a, b, c, d; 2014a, b). Culturally 
supported habits influence the behaviors of relevant actors such as governments, firms, victims 
and hackers. As mentioned earlier, cultural factors influence how issues around a cybercrime are 
constructed, and how a cybercrime is defined, conceptualized, theorized, measured, responded to 
and policed (Brownstein, 2000). Saney (1986, p. 10) noted that culture is related to crime 
 
in its influence in encouraging certain types of antisocial behavior, in how we treat 
convicted felons, and in promoting the types of attitudes and perceptions in the public 
that either directly or indirectly influence the spread or restriction of criminal behavior in 
society. 
 
Put simply, a crime is an activity or a behavior prohibited by a society, which falls within the 
society’s criminal code (Cohen, 1992). As noted earlier, while pornography is crime in some 
countries, it is not in others. The Arab culture offers an interesting setting to illustrate this idea. 
Cultural, socio-political and cognitive factors in the region have important effects on these 
economies’ cybercrime fighting measures. In August 2010, Saudi Arabia’s Commission for the 
Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (also known as the Haia) announced that it would 
establish a unit to fight cybercrimes. The Haia also noted that the cybercrime unit’s initial focus 
would be on cases involving online blackmail of women (arabianbusiness.com, 2010). 
 
Some cultural factors provide a conducive environment for cybercrime activities. For instance, 
Husted (2000) found evidence that software piracy is more likely to occur in a culture that puts 
emphasis on sharing among group members, suggesting that a possible solution for piracy in this 
culture is to demonstrate piracy as a shameful act. Evidence also shows that most high-profile 
and widely publicized cybercrimes in India are concentrated in the offshore sector. It was 
reported in February 2010 that an employee in the IT giant Wipro used his colleague’s password 
to steal some U.S.$4 million from the company’s bank account (Mishra, 2010). 
 
Culture’s effect on the nature of cybercrimes committed by cybercriminals 
 
Skorodumova (2004) provides a useful set of distinctions for characterizing hacking cultures 
associated with different nationalities. The American hackers, for instance, are characterized by 
personal motives such as self-advertising compared to Russians or Europeans. European hackers 
refrain from attacking well-known sites and advertising themselves. The U.S. specialists believe 
that European hackers more often attack websites in protest or in defense of human rights. 
Likewise, Russian hackers see authority and laws as hostile. 
 
As is the case of crime subculture observed in the conventional world (De La Calle Robles, 
2007), what seems to be happening is region-specific specialization in cybercrime activities. 
Evidence indicates that cybercrimes originated in Asia exploit vulnerabilities in common 
software applications to steal personal information. Eastern European criminals are linked with 
organized crimes and identity theft (Fitzgerald, 2008). Romanian criminals, for instance, have 
distinctive advantage in online auction frauds. In auctions for big-ticket items, Romanians 
arguably “own the game” (Wylie, 2007). They have allegedly developed an ecosystem to auction 
fraud bringing together various players and technologies. Likewise, the Ukrainian criminal world 
is considered to be a “leader” in online credit card crime (Wylie, 2007). Hackers from the Middle 
East, on the other hand, have a higher tendency to deface websites (Fitzgerald, 2008). Likewise, 
Skorodumova (2004) linked national subculture with different characteristics of intrinsically 
motivated hacking. 
 
Some cyberspace activities that are considered as cyberoffenses in some contexts are more likely 
to be justified in other cultural contexts. For instance, a Business Week article (23 June 2008) 
reported that China’s public relations firms such as Daqi.com, Chinese Web Union and CIC 
charge U.S.$500–$25,000 monthly to monitor online posts. They help minimize the impact of 
negative information and create positive brand value for the company. There are reports that 
these PR firms hire students to write good posts about certain brands and to criticize the 
competition. While critics are concerned about the manipulation of consumer reviews and paid 
reviews, astroturfers in China have not faced legal problems. Note that in an astroturfing activity, 
the sponsoring organization of a message is masked, which is common in China outside of 
cybercrime as well. One way to understand the China–U.S. difference is to consider their 
experiences with modern capitalism. Many successful firms in mature market economies are 
guided by customer orientation and demonstrate their commitment to customer focus. Customers 
in these economies exhibit a low tolerance for poor behavior if businesses and suppliers do not 
fulfill their implicit and explicit commitments. Due to China’s short history of modern 
capitalism, Chinese clients and customers are more likely to tolerate an absence of business 
ethics and a low level of product and service quality and/or reliability (Kshetri, 2010a, 2011). 
 
Culture and cybersecurity 
 
Our discussion thus far has focused on how various aspects of culture are linked to cybercrime. 
However, there is also another side of the coin, namely, cybersecurity. While the top security 
software firms are U.S.-based, businesses and consumers in some developing countries (e.g., 
Southeast Asia) prefer to buy domestically manufactured software for reasons of nationalism 
(Information Today, 2008; Kshetri, 2010c). Prior research has also suggested that cultural factors 
are linked to national development of cybersecurity skills. A senior fellow at Tokyo’s Center for 
International Public Policy Studies notes that, in common with other professionals, Japanese 
cybersecurity specialists seek lifetime employment. In highly mobile job markets such as in the 
U.S., however, workers frequently move among the public sector, private sector and academia, 
which facilitates the institutional transfer of IT skills (Kshetri, 2014a). The lack of job mobility 
has led to a severe shortage of cybersecurity skills in Japan. As reported in a Reuter’s article on 
17 March 2014, Japan’s IT minister, Ichita Yamamoto, admitted that the country’s cybersecurity 
is lagging behind the U.S. and emphasized promoting computer science programs among 
Japanese students in order to reduce reliance on imported security software and strengthen 
cybersecurity. 
 
Let’s take another example to illustrate the effect of culture on cybersecurity. Indian firms 
engaged in outsourcing have taken measures to prevent cybercrimes by current and former 
employees. Indian and foreign firms are following the security practices of Western firms, some 
of which are incompatible with local culture. For instance, call center employees have to undergo 
security checks, which are considered to be “undignified” (The Economist, 2005). The U.S. 
computer firm Dell faced difficulties in retaining its employees in its Indian call centers when the 
company attempted to emulate its headquarters model in treating the local employees (Kaka, 
2006). 
 
Justifiability and acceptability of victimizing cultural Others 
 
Some examples of boundaries that separate perpetrators and potential victims and are likely to 
make cyberattacks more justifiable and acceptable from the perpetrators’ perspective are 
presented in Table 30.1. 
 
Table 30.1   Some examples of boundaries that separate perpetrators and potential victims and 
make cyberattacks more justifiable and acceptable 
Source of otherness Explanation Some examples 
Different nationality Launching cyberattacks against individuals 
and organizations from other nations 
Chinese hackers’ cyber wars with 
Indonesians, Japanese and U.S. hackers 
Different ideology Using cyberattacks as a tool to attack an 
ideology 
A Japanese student attacking Korean 
Internet servers to protest the war in Iraq 
Different religion Using cyberattacks against those who 
challenge one’s religious beliefs and values 




Launching financially motivated cyberattacks 
against rich people 





Nationalism and patriotism are universally accepted as vital elements of state strength 
(Alagappa, 1995, 26–27). Salmon (1995) argues that “patriotism or attachment to one’s country 
often leads to actions and attitudes which are disinterested or self-sacrificing, help solve free-
riding problems” (p. 296). Prior research has shown that patriotism and nationalism provide 
cognitive legitimacy of some hackers’ activities. We can find many instances of hackings linked 
to nationalism and patriotism. To take an example, in the early 1990s, a group of Portuguese 
hackers named TOXYN infiltrated a number of Indonesian government websites to fight against 
the occupation of East Timor (de Kloet, 2002). Indonesian hackers responded by attacking 
Portuguese servers that hosted the East Timor movement (Antariksa, 2001). To take another 
example, in 1997, cyberattacks occurred in Sri Lanka in support of the Tamil Tiger separatists. 
The strike was intended to disrupt government communications by overloading Sri Lankan 
embassies with millions of emails (Havely, 2000). To take yet another example, in 1998, the 
Indian army’s website on Kashmir was hijacked by supporters of Pakistan’s claim to the disputed 
territory, who plastered the site with their own political slogans (Havely, 2000). In response, in 
July 2001, the website of the Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Tayiba was attacked by a 
hacker who called himself/ herself “True Indian” (Peer, 2001). It was in response to attacks of G-
force, a Pakistani hacker group, to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ websites. 
 
We further illustrate this idea with examples of Chinese hackers’ engagement in cyber wars, 
especially with U.S. hackers. Before proceeding further, let us briefly review Chinese and U.S. 
versions of nationalism and patriotism. Pei (2003) has identified several dimensions of 
nationalism. Consider two of them: source and bases. In terms of source, he argues that some 
examples of nationalism are a product of grass-root voluntarism (as U.S. nationalism) while 
others are fostered by government elites and promoted by the apparatus of the state (police, 
military, state-run media). Chinese nationalism is viewed as state sponsored and an attempt to fill 
an “ideological vacuum” left by the weakening socialism (Christensen, 1996; Oksenberg, 1987). 
In terms of bases, Pei distinguishes nationalism related to universalistic ideals (democracy, rule 
of law, free marketplace) and institutions from that based on ethnicity, religion, language and 
geography. China falls into the latter category. In China, the state arguably bolsters its legitimacy 
through invoking a deep sense of “Chineseness” among citizens (Ong, 1997; Barme, 1999; 
Hansen, 1999). China has adapted a body of complex scholarship to invoke a deep sense of 
“Chineseness.” Sautman (2001) concludes: “Nowhere is this more pronounced than in China, 
where these disciplines [archaeology and paleoanthropology] provide the conceptual warp and 
woof of China’s racial nationalism.” 
 
Chinese hackers have expressed their patriotic and nationalistic longings in several cyber wars. 
In August 1999, Web defacements led to a cyber war between Chinese and Taiwanese hackers. 
Initially, Chinese hackers defaced several Taiwanese websites with pro-China messages and said 
that Taiwan was and would always be a part of China (Denning, 2001). The Chinese have also 
fought cyber wars with Indonesians and Japanese hackers (de Kloet, 2002). 
 
The U.S.–China cyber wars are particularly telling. In September 1999, following the accidental 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, a group of hackers that identified itself as Level 
Seven Crew, defaced the website of the U.S. embassy in China and replaced the home page with 
racist and antigovernment slogans (Denning, 2001). Following the collision of a U.S. 
surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter in 2001, a Chinese hacking group published its plans for 
a “Net War,” which was planned to continue until the anniversary of the bombing in Belgrade. In 
response, hacking groups from the U.S., Brazil and Europe attacked Chinese websites. Chinese 
hackers reportedly attacked about 1,100 U.S. websites while U.S. hackers broke into 1,600 
Chinese websites (Kshetri, 2005). Similarly, after the collision of a Chinese fighter jet with a 
U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001, a Chinese hacking group attacked hundreds of U.S. 
websites including that of the White House (Bridis, 2001). 
 
A comparative study between mailings of Chinese and Americans indicated that fierce feelings 
of nationalist fervor had fueled both camps (Kluver, 2001, p. 7). On several American websites, 
Chinese left: “We are ready to devote anything to our motherland, including our lives” (Smith, 
2001). The Chinese hackers involved in the attacks argued that they were patriotic and thus did 
not do anything wrong. Analyzing the U.S.–China cyber wars, Kluver (2001, p. 8) concluded 
that “the technological optimism which sees in the Internet the end of nationalism and 





In addition to nationalism and religion, hackers’ interests are also framed by ideologies such as 
fight against global capitalism and against nuclear proliferation (de Kloet, 2002). For instance, 
some hackers are likely to attack networks of big multinationals to fight against capitalism. To 
take an example of ideological hacking, in June 1998, six hackers from the U.S., the UK, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand (identifying themselves as Milworm) hacked the website of 
India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and left a message: “If a nuclear war does start, 
you will be the first to scream” (Denning, 2001). Similarly, in South Korea, 58 Internet servers 





Hackings by Islamic activists are interesting examples of cyberattacks that fall in this category. 
Except for occasional India–Pakistan and Israel–Palestine cyber wars, hacking by Islamist 
activists was insignificant before 11 September 2001. mi2g Intelligence Unit reported increasing 
Islamist hacking, the targets being networks of the U.S., Britain, Australia and other coalition 
partners as well as domestic networks of Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco and Kuwait. 
 
The holistic nature of Islamic society could help explain why a high proportion of cyber-attacks 
originating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are motivated by religious 
factors. For instance, following the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) interception of a flotilla 
carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza in May 2010, tens of thousands of email addresses, passwords 
and personal details of Israelis were allegedly stolen by Turkish hackers. It was reported that 
there was dispute among the Turkish hackers in the online forum about the appropriateness of 
using the information for financial gain. Some hackers felt that using the information to steal 
money would undermine their political agenda. There was also a discussion of what the Koran 
says is permissible to do with the money of “infidels” (haaretz.com, 2010). 
 
Economically more privileged classes 
 
Cultural attitudes towards the potential victim are also related to the perpetrators’ propensity to 
engage in cybercrimes. It is, for instance, reported that many Indonesian hackers feel that cyber 
fraud is wrong but acceptable, especially if the credit card owner is rich and not an Indonesian. A 
carder reportedly said: “Yes, it’s wrong but it really only hurts other rich countries that were 
dumb enough to let us. Why should an Indonesian get arrested for damaging American 
business?” (Shubert, 2003). Another carder said: “I only choose those people who are truly rich. 
I’m not comfortable using the money of poor people. I also don’t want to use credit cards 
belonging to Indonesians. Those are a carder’s ethics” (Antariksa, 2001, p. 16). 
 
Discussion and implications 
 
The previous discussion indicates that there are important cross-cultural dimensions of cyber-
crime and cybersecurity, which are more complicated than meets the eye. There are important 
cross-cultural differences regarding what actions or activities are viewed as cybercrimes and how 
such crimes are policed, enforced and disciplined. Important cross-cultural variations also exist 
in social orientation towards various ingredients of cybercrime, propensity to engage in cyber-
crimes, attitude towards potential victims and nature of cyberoffenses committed. Finally, this 
chapter has provided a new perspective on the literature of the cultural Other by providing an 
overview of boundaries separating perpetrators and potential victims, which are likely to make 
cyberattacks more justifiable and acceptable from the perpetrators’ perspectives. 
 
Prior researchers noted that compared to formal rules, which may change quickly due to political 
and judicial measures, deliberate policies and actions often would have little effect to change 
informal institutions such as cultures and norms (North, 1990). Basic international patterns of 
cybercrimes and cyberattacks are less likely to change significantly in the near future. That is, 
one can expect cyberattacks driven by nationalism during international conflicts and wars from 
China. Hackers from the MENA region are likely to engage mostly in politically and 
ideologically motivated cyberattacks. Cybercrimes from Eastern European economies, on the 
other hand, are likely to involve economic gains. 
 
Likewise, cybercriminals’ cultural attitudes towards the potential victims of various categories 
are less likely to change in the near future. 
 
That does not imply, however, that cultures related to cybercrime and cybersecurity cannot be 
changed at all. Since cultural factors affect the attitudes of individuals and organizations towards 
cybercrime and cybersecurity capabilities across countries, policy makers can make efforts to 
influence culture so that it is more intolerant of cybercrimes and conducive to cybersecurity. 
Perhaps an initial step is building a cybercrime consciousness, and a common understanding 
about the economic and social costs of cybercrimes and cybersecurity among citizens in order to 
prompt new habits of cybercrime avoidance and protection. 
 
While this chapter has focused on cultural factors, these factors are not, in themselves, sufficient 
to explain cybercrime and cybersecurity. Further studies are warranted to fully understand the 
patterns of cybercrime cases and measures for cybersecurity across countries. These studies 
would undoubtedly contribute to creating a secure cyber environment for businesses and 
consumers. 
 
The insights developed in this paper have important implications for CCM. The most often cited 
figure for the annual worldwide loss to cybercrime is U.S.$1 trillion and according to the 2011 
Norton Cybercrime Report released by Symantec, 69 percent of the world’s Internet users have 
been victimized by cybercriminals at some point in their lives (Kshetri, 2013d). The impact of 
cultural factors on cybercrime and cybersecurity as noted here suggests that the standard recipes, 
models and procedures for firms to be culturally aware and sensitive are highly inadequate for 
engagement with international crime of this complexity and on this scale. A related point is that 
whereas companies have faced rapidly growing cyber threats, a one-size-fits-all approach cannot 
address the global cybersecurity challenges. The degrees and types of threats faced by a 
multinational company are likely to differ drastically across countries. The discussion suggests 
that different cultures differ in the degree to which various forms of intrinsically and extrinsically 
motivated hacking activities are committed by individuals. Likewise, cybersecurity-related 
training to employees, and other interventions are more important in some cultures. For instance, 
an emphasis on the importance of keeping one’s password confidential might be necessary in 
cultures that view sharing among group members as an important social aspect. 
 
This chapter also makes it clear that a firm that is characterized by a high degree of Otherness in 
a foreign country is more likely to face cyberattacks. For instance, a multinational company is 
more likely to be a cybercrime victim in a country characterized by resistance to capitalism. 
Likewise, a Western company is more likely to be associated with economically more privileged 
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